CO129-591-14 Military Administration- liaison with Chinese and American forces 11-4-1945 - 25-7-1945 — Page 97

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he said, that Shanghai was attacked, there would be three possibilities which his section had to try to cover. The first was that the Japanese would have to evacuate so rapidly that very little damage would

In that case have been done to existing facilities. the Military would be able to take over such plants as the Shanghai Waterworks and, if they had some knowledge of the internal organisation of the plant, would be able to put them into working order again at short notice. The second possibility was that the Japanese would indulge in a "scorched earth" policy and largely destroy the existing facilities of the city. It would be his section's duty to plan the inauguration of essential services as rapidly as possible and knowledge of what had cxisted in the past would again be of the greatest utility. The third possibility, was that the Japanese would destroy what they considered to be essential machinery in the docks and public utilities, while leaving the vast mase of buildings etc., relatively unharmed, It was the job of his section to endeavour to assess what type of equipment would be immediately required in order that utility services might be re-started with the least possible delay. I would appreciate that this mcant long-range planning, since it would be necessary to establish at some convenient point stocks of likely materials and machinery which could be transporte with the highest priority to the place where they were needed; and to prepare this plan it was essential that his section should have the fullest information as to existing facilities. It was in order to tap British information on these matters that he had suggested that a military officer be appointed to form a channel for consultation on these matters. It would have to be a uniformed officer because the security regulations applying in the United States forces precluded the discussion of strategic plans with civilians,

How that officer handled matters after he had been consulted by G5 did not concern G5, and he imagined that in fact the officer would be to some extent a post office. It would, of course, be helpful if he had some China experience and some general economic understanding.

I promised General Olmsted that I would put this suggestion forward and said that I felt sure the Ambassador would consider it with sympathy. I asked whether in fact, since the majority of our interests were concentrated in the ports, it would not really be of greater value to have such an officer attached to either Admiral Nimitz or General MacArthur. General Olmsted said that the time might come when it would be necessary to have such officers attached both to the Pacific Commands and to China, but that in any case there would be a large number of problems which would have to be handled in Chungking with the Chinese Government, even though the operation was being undertaken into the China Theatre by another command, He suggested that it was therefore necessary to have

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